Search results for "Bank risk"
showing 6 items of 6 documents
Stress test impact and bank risk profile: Evidence from macro stress testing in Europe
2019
Abstract This study investigates the risk profile of banks that get a significant capital level reduction in the EU-wide stress test exercises. Using the CAMELS multifaceted risk approach, we look into the connection between the bank risk factors and the macro stress testing impact on capital. The results show that financial institutions that are inefficient or complex, with low profitability levels and small loan portfolio, receive highly negative results in the stress tests. As this risk profile is not consistent over time, the results support the stress tests disciplinary role, suggesting risk management strategy adjustment through consideration of prior stress test outcomes.
How Do Insured Deposits Affect Bank Risk? Evidence from the 2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
2017
Abstract This paper tests whether an increase in insured deposits causes banks to become more risky. We use variation introduced by the U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008, which increased the deposit insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor and bank. For some banks, the amount of insured deposits increased significantly; for others, it was a minor change. Our analysis shows that the more affected banks increase their investments in risky commercial real estate loans and become more risky relative to unaffected banks following the change. This effect is most distinct for affected banks that are low capitalized.
GOVERNANCE-BASED ACQUISITIONS AND RISK TAKING IN BANKING
2008
We examine the market for corporate control in banking when strategic acquisitions are driven by the different governance structures of commercial and savings banks. In contrast to profit-maximizing entities, we show that savings institutions can have acquisition incentives from their peculiar governance and ownership structure. Governance-based acquisition incentives, which interact with the specifics of the loan market in affecting bank risk taking, can arise when acquisitions take place sequentially or simultaneously, and also when financial intermediaries affect risk taking directly through the target return of investments or indirectly through the loan interest rate.
European Banking Union and bank risk disclosure: the effects of the Single Supervisory Mechanism
2022
AbstractThis paper provides evidence on the impact of European Banking Union (BU) and the associated Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) on the risk disclosure practices of European banks. The onset of BU and the associated rules are considered as an exogenous shock that provides the setting for a natural experiment to analyze the effects of the new supervisory arrangements on bank risk disclosure practices. A Difference-in-Differences approach is adopted, building evidence from the disclosure practices of systemically important banks supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB) and other banks supervised by national regulators over the period 2012–2017. The main findings are that bank risk…
An empirical investigation into market risk disclosure: is there room to improve for Italian banks?
2020
PurposeThis paper aims to examine the market risk disclosure practices of large Italian banks. The contribution provides insights on the way banks should provide information about market risk. The problem related to the asymmetric information between banks from one side, and investors and stakeholders on the other, represents a crucial issue that requires further considerations by scholars and regulators.Design/methodology/approachThis contribution adopts a mixed methodological approach to analyse both qualitative and quantitative profiles of market risk disclosure in banking. This paper analyses the most important documents Italian banks are required to prepare for risk disclosure purposes…
Risk management in the banking industry
2016
El negocio bancario está altamente regulado porque las instituciones financieras captan ahorro público y tienen riesgos específicos y complejidades que hacen que sus estados financieros sean opacos y difíciles de analizar por el público en general (Petrella y Resti, 2013; Morgan, 2001). Para entender y monitorear los riesgos específicos en las empresas del sector financiero, el regulador estadounidense diseñó el sistema de evaluación CAMELS, que es comúnmente utilizado por los reguladores de todo el mundo para evaluar la solidez de las instituciones financieras y para evaluar el nivel de riesgo de los bancos (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 2013). Los riesgos que este enfoque eva…